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Abstract
We consider a repeated contract game between a sponsor and a
contractor concerning a large scale project where the project requires a
number of tasks to be completed before the benefit from the project can be
realized. There is cost uncertainty and the contractor has private, task
specific information which is relevant in cost determination. Moreover the
contractor supplies effort which affects the cost of completing a task.
Thus the sponsor must resolve both moral hazard and adverse selection
problems in designing the remuneration scheme offered to the contractor.
We focus on the case where the sponsor cannot precommit to compensation
per task and where the contractor is not bound to complete the project. We
demonstrate that the equilibrium compensation path rises as the project
nears completion giving the appearance of cost overruns towards the tail
end of the project. We also consider several extensions of the basic model
which amplify on these results.
^Department of Economics
University of Illinois
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, Illinois 61820
U.S.A.
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A Sequential Equilibrium Model of Cost Overruns in Long Term Projects
by Lanny Arvan and Antonio Leite
I Introduction
Anyone with a rough familiarity of large scale contracts sponsored by
government agencies is well aware that such projects often involve cost
overruns. The procurement of new weaponry and the development of new
nuclear power plants offers just two of the the more prominent examples
where cost overruns appear common. The 'horror stories' abound and
frequently receive extensive media coverage. 1 . From the vantage of
professional economists this phenomenon offers two distinct sources of
interest, First, is there a satisfactory explanation? Such an explanation
would obviously have to account for whether it matters that the sponsorship
of such projects is typically by a government agency rather than by private
enterprise and would also have to account for whether it matters that the
scale of the project is usually very large rather than not so large. Second,
is this something that economists should be worrying about? That is, do
cost overruns constitute prima facie evidence of gross inefficiency in
government procurement? In more popular jargon, is the public being bilked
over and over again and, if so, are there any recommendations that we as
economists can make as partial remedy?
In this paper we provide a positive model which predicts cost
overruns as the sequential equilibrium outcome of a dynamic contract game
concerning a large scale project between a single sponsor and contractor
1 A sampling of one month of the Wall Street Journal has provided two examples of such horror
stories: The stealth bomber program ( February 25, 1 986 p.3) and the Comanche Peak nuclear
power plant (February 16, 1988, p. 7)
We follow the optimal regulation literature, Baron and Myerson ( 1 982),
Baron and Besanko ( 1 984 ) and ( 1 987), Laffont and Tirole ( 1 986), et. al.Jn
assuming that this contracting problem contains elements of both adverse
selection and moral hazard. That is, we assume the contractor has some
private information as to project cost which is unobservable by the sponsor
and the contractor makes some decisions over the inputs it supplies in
completing the project based on this private information. We also follow
the optimal regulation literature in assuming that the sponsor's benefit
from completion of the project is publicly known. Other recent papers
dealing specifically with procurement, e.g., Riordan ( 1 986) and Tirole
(1986) have focused on the contracting problem under bilateral asymmetric
information, where the sponsor's valuation as well as the contractor's cost
is uncertain. Because we are interested in the underlying dynamics rather
than in mechanism design issues per se, we take a simpler route in the
development of the model by focusing exclusively on cost uncertainty.
The formulations in the above mentioned optimal regulation papers
are static and have the feature that both benefits and costs are realized
simultaneously. We depart from the optimal regulation literature in our
assumption that the project requires a multiplicity of tasks.2 In our model
there is a cost realization after each task has been completed but the
benefit does not accrue to the sponsor until the entire project is finished.
The moral hazard in our paper arises because upon completion of each task
2 See Baron ( 1 986) for a oVnamic version of the optimal regulation model. The only paper that
we are aware of which specifically deals with procurement in a dynamic context Is Lewis ( 1 986).
Lewis considers the Bayes equilibrium of a repeated contract game where the sponsor learns over
time about the contractor's private Information and the sponsor may cancel the project at any time
if the sponsor's beliefs about this private information are sufficiently pessimistic Lewis' model
does predict cost overruns as equilibrium outcomes but he takes the sharing rule by which the
sponsor is compensated to be parametric. See note 1 2.
the contractor sends a signal to the sponsor as to the cost involved. This
signalled cost accurately reflects the cost reducing effort provided by the
contractor. However, signalled cost is but one component of the
contractor's actual cost in completing the task. The contractor faces a
cost from taking the effort which affects the signalled cost. This effort
cost component is not observed by the sponsor since it depends on the task
specific information. Moreover, the sum of the effort and signalled cost
may or may not be minimized by the contractor taking cost reducing effort,
depending on the realization of the task specific information. Since we
model the sponsor as the residual claimant, the sponsor has incentive to
design the contract so as to minimize the sum of the effort and signalled
cost. But since the remuneration the contractor receives is a function of
the signalled cost only, the sponsor must design the contract to induce self-
selection on the part of the contractor.
In the absence of any nonlinearity in the contractor's utility function
a fixed payment, independent of the signalled cost, would indeed induce
self-selection. However, we assume that the contractor is not bound to
complete the project and can drop out at any time prior to project
completion. In designing the contract, the sponsor is well aware that the
contractor has the option to separate. Hence, fixed payment schemes will
not be optimal because such schemes will induce excessive separation.
Holmstrom (1983) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) obtain a similar result
in a labor contract model where the reservation wage is random. The
conclusion these authors obtain is that the contract wage is downward
rigid, but adjusts in an upward direction when the realization of the
reservation wage Is particularly high. The effect is to create a "tilting" in
the employee compensation scheme, i.e., the wage-earnings profile is
steeper than the reservation wage profile, whereby rent accruing to the
employee is increasing in seniority. Lazear ( 1 979) and ( 1 98 1 ) obtains a
similar result when the problem is the employee effort rather than the
employee quit moral hazard. In Lazear's model the tilting arises because the
firm wishes to have its employees post implicit bonds which are forfeited
in the event that workers are caught shirking.3
In these dynamic labor contract models it is assumed that the firm
can credibly commit to the entire lifetime compensation scheme of its
employees. In fact most of the contracting literature has adopted this
asymmetric approach where the firm has total precommitment power while
workers have no precommitment power.4 In our model we assume that
neither the sponsor nor the contractor has a precommitment capability.
That is, the possibility that the contractor drops out is accompanied by the
chance that the sponsor will terminate the project and by the fact that the
sponsor is free to alter the contractor's remuneration function after each
task has been completed.5 We show that cost overruns can be viewed as the
equilibrium outcome of such a contract model.6
3 Other authors have explained tilting in the employee compensation scheme as a consequence of
the firm's desire to screen workers for specific attributes For example see Salop and Salop
(1976).
4 However , see Macleod and Malcomson ( 1 987) for a noteworthy exception.
5 Since the sponsor can alter the remuneration function after the completion of each task , the
sponsor can induce the contractor to drop out by making the remuneration sufficiently
unattractive. This is the method bv which the sponsor cancels the project in our model.
6 This result Is somewhat surprising In that Arvan ( 1 988) has shown, In a Lazear-style shirking
model, that when the firm does not have a precommitment capability with regard to the wage it
offers the equilibrium wage-earnings profile tends to be flat.
5The intuition behind the tilting which occurs In our model is that the
sponsor's attitude towards project completion changes with the number of
tasks remaining. Towards the end of the project the sponsor is 'locked in,'
the costs associated with contractor remuneration for already completed
tasks are sunk and the sponsor will fund the project henceforth, regardless
of the remaining costs involved. During lock-in the sponsor's prevalent
concern is the threat of contractor drop-out. As a result the sponsor is
willing to make high payments to the contractor during lock-in. The
contractor can expect to earn some quasirents during lock-in since the
remuneration scheme satisfies self-selection. Early on in the contract the
sponsor is less concerned about project completion and will cancel the
project unless tasks come in at low cost. In the early stages the
equilibrium remuneration scheme is cost plus, i.e., the contractor is paid the
minimum to satisfy the drop-out moral hazard constraint. During this
period there are no rents earned by the contractor. The overall effect is to
make payments rise over time as tasks are completed, giving the appearance
of cost overruns toward the end of the project.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we develop the basic model. Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of
sequential equilibrium of the dynamic contract game. In section 4 we
provide three extensions of the basic model to separately consider the
effects of contractor risk aversion, the effects of noise in the cost
signalling process, and the effects of contractor impatience. Finally, we
offer a brief conclusion in section 5 where we take up the policy
Implications of our analysis.
II. The Model
We consider the relationship between a sponsor and a contractor
over the construction of a large scale project. Assume that the project
requires a prespecified number of tasks, N, for completion. For simplicity
assume that each task lasts 1 period. Let i be an index which refers both to
the number of tasks and the number of periods remaining till completion of
the project; 1 = 1,...,N. Let B denote the benefit accruing to the sponsor in
the event the project is completed. It is assumed that the benefit to the
sponsor is zero in the event that the project is not completed.
At the start of period i nature makes a move. Let L denote this
random variable and L denote the realization of this random variable.
t| € {E,H}, where L - E means that the ith task is easy while tj = H means
that the ith task is hard. We assume that L and t* are statistically
independent for all h,i = 1,...,N, h* i. Let Pr {t
1
= H} = d. This probability is
taken to represent the subjective beliefs of the sponsor concerning the
difficulty of task i. Assume < < 1. L is observed by the contractor but
not by the sponsor. However, 6 is taken to be common knowledge
After nature's move the sponsor chooses the compensation function,
p^. We elaborate on Pj below. The contractor then chooses an indicator
variable, Qj, Qj e {0, 1 }, such that if Qj = 1 the contractor has decided to
complete task i while if Qj = the contractor has decided to quit and drop
out of the project in period i. The choice of Qj is based on n, n 2 0, the per
period opportunity profit level the contractor can experience elsewhere,
and the rents the contractor expects to earn from continuing to participate
in the project. The game ends if the contractor drops out. If the contractor
has decided to complete task i the contractor then chooses the level of cost
7reducing effort, e^, e^ € {0,1}, where e^ = 1 denotes that cost reducing effort
has Deen taken and e< = denotes that no cost reducing effort has been
taken.
The sponsor receives a perfectly informative signal of the cost
reducing effort, s^ s< = e j wL + ( 1 -e
1
) w
H
,
where w L < w . We refer to s
1
as
the signalled cost. When $* = wL the contractor indicates to the sponsor
that the task is low cost while when Si = wn the contractor indicates the
task is high cost. Signalled cost is but one component of the actual cost
involved in completing task i, ca(tj,Sj). ca(t*,S|) = Sj + ce(tj,Sj) + c (t
{
),
where c^tj.sJ denotes the cost to the contractor from taking cost
7\(\
reducing effort and c it*) denotes the cost to the contractor due to thet aa(
1
task advantage, i.e., whether the task is easy or hard. The effort cost
component is given by
(1) ce(t
r
wH ) = fort
t
«E,H,
c
e(E,wL ) = w - wL - a, and ce(H,w L ) > w - w L
,
H I
where a is a constant. < a < w - w Thus cost reducing effort reduires
the expenditure of real resources and the sponsor will need to provide
incentives to the contractor to induce such effort. The task advantage term
is given by
(2) c
ad
(E) = - (wH - wL - a) and cad(H) = 0.
Thus the actual cost function is given by
(3) ca(E,wL ) = w L
.
c
a(E,w H ) = w L + a,
c
a(H,w L ) > wH
,
and ca(H,w H ) = wH
Note that cost reducing effort is efficient, in the sense of minimizing
actual costs in period i, only if task 1 Is easy. Also note that we have
designed the actual cost function so that actual cost coincides with
signalled cost when the task is easy, if the contractor takes cost reducing
effort, and again when the task is hard, if the contractor does not take cost
reducing effort. We shall refer to this case where actual and signalled cost
coincide as truthful signalling on the part of the contractor
Neither the effort cost nor the task advantage component are
observed by the sponsor. Hence, the compensation function depends on
signalled costs only, not on actual cost. That is p.: {w L ,w } - R, where
p^w1 ) is the payment the sponsor makes to the contractor upon completion
of task 1 when the signalled cost is wL and P;(wH ) is defined similarly when
the signalled cost is w
Equilibrium
H 7
We wish to analyze sequential equilibrium of this contract game 6 To
get the reader familiar with the underlying issues, we shall first consider
' Note that in its most general form we can imagine the compensation function to depend on the
history of signalled costs through period i, H,,H| = (Wki_i .-»U. In this paper we restrict
attention to history independent compensation functions. Since the contractor only observes t
.
at the start of period l , there does not appear to be any loss in making this restriction.
8 Note that we don't have well defined subgames in our model because when the sponsor chooses the
compensation function the sponsor's information set is not a singleton. We trust that this will not
create any confusion for the reader in the subsequent analysis.
the special case where N = 1. The main ideas are transparent in this case
and can then be readily extended to the more general case.
We proceed via backward induction. First, consider the cost reducing
effort decision of the contractor given the prespecified compensation
scheme, p^, and given that the contractor has chosen to complete the
project. Then, e,= l only if
(4) pjiw 1-) - ca(t 1fw L ) 2 p!(wH ) - ca(t 1;w
H
).
Substituting (3) into (4) when 1 < » E yields
(5) p^w1 ) ^p
]
(wH )-a.
When (5) is violated the contractor has no incentive to take cost reducing
effort. In the sequel we will restrict attention to the case where
I H
P|(w L ) spj(w ). Then (3) and (4) imply that the contractor will not take
cost reducing effort when t, = H. Moreover, we will assume that when task
1 is easy the contractor does indeed take cost reducing effort as long as (5)
is satisfied. Given these additional assumptions we shall refer to (5) as a
self-selection constraint in that (5) induces truthful signalling
Second, consider the contractor participation decision. Recall that if
the contractor chooses to drop out the contractor earns n. Thus, Q| = 1 only
if
(6) maximum P|(S|) - ca(t|,s,) 2 tt
s
l
Note that when t, * H, (6) reduces to
(7) p
]
(wH)^wH +n.
Substituting (7) Into (5) yields
(8) p
]
(wL)2wH -a + tt.
Evidently, if (8) holds then (6) does not bind when s . = E. In other words, if
the sponsor induces participation by the contractor with a hard task and
induces cost reducing effort by the contractor with an easy task then the
U I
contractor with and easy task earns a rent of at least w - w L - a. The
sponsor can extract this rent from the contractor with an easy task but
only by inducing the contractor with a hard task to drop out. This is the
tradeoff the sponsor contemplates in choosing the compensation scheme
Finally, we consider the sponsor's choice of the compensation
function, p^. We assume that the sponsor's goal is to maximize the expected
net benefit, i.e., the product of the conditional expectation of the benefit
minus the construction costs associated with completion of the project and
the probability that the project is completed. The sponsor's problem is
given by
(9) maximize (1 - e)Q,(wL )[B - p^w 1 )] + 0Q
1
(wH )[B - p,(wH )]
Subject to : i Q |(s j) s 1 , Q |(s j)[p j(s j) - s | - tt]2 0, and
(1 -QjCspXfl
-P|(S|) + SjhO forsj - wL ,wH ;as well as (5) 9
9 In (9) we invoke the revelation principal , see Myerson ( 1979) or Harris and Townsend
( 1 98 1 ), by asserting that there is an optimal compensation function which induces truthful
signalling on the part of the contractor. This is why ( 5) is taken as a constraint and why we have
om itted
1 1 as an argument of Q
,
Note that in (9) we treat Q«(Si) as a probability rather than as an indicator
variable. If at the optimum <Q|(Sj) < 1, then it must be that
Pj(Sj) - Sj - tt = and B- Pj(S|) = 0, in which case Qj(Sj) = or 1 is also
optimal. The solution to (9) is easy to characterize and is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 : Let (pj,Q|) denote a solution to (9). Then
(i) p*(w L ) < w L tt, p*(wH ) < wL a + tt, and Q* =
If bi W L + TT,
(11) p*(wL ) = wL + tt, p*(wH ) < wL a tt, Q*(wL ) = 1, and
H I
i_i i u u ww a
Q «(wn ) = if w L + n i B < wn + tt or if B i wn + tt and 6 < ;
,
and
1 B-w L-a-TT
(iii) p*(w L ) = wH - a + tt, p*(wH ) = wH + n, and Q* = 1
H I
h ww a
if B l w
n
+ TT and 6 l ; .
B-wL-a-n
Proof : First note that if if B i s^ + tt then it is optimal for the sponsor to
cancel the project when the actual cost is s,. In our formulation, the
sponsor cancels the project by inducing the sponsor to drop out. This is
accomplished by violating the voluntary participation constraint (6), in
which case Gj(Sj) = 0. If Q«(s«) > at the optimum then the objective
function is decreasing in Pj(sJ. Hence, either the voluntary participation
or the self-selection constraint must bind. If B > w L + n then it is always
optimal to induce the contractor with an easy task to complete the project,
i.e., Q^w1 ) = 1 is optimal, since inducing the low cost contractor to quit
implies that the project will never be built. Finally, suppose B > wH + tt. If
I HQ|(w L )= 1 andQj(w ) = 0, then the maximum value the objective takes on is
( 1 -d)[3 - wL - tt]. If Qi = 1 , then the maximum value the objective takes on
is B - w - tt ( 1 - 0)a. The former exceeds the latter if and only if
H I
w -w -a
6 <
B-wL -a-n
Suppose the sponsor would want the project completed if the
sponsor knew that the task was hard. When the sponsor doesn"t know
whether the task is easy or hard proposition I demonstrates that the
tradeoff between rent extraction from the contractor with an easy task and
completion of the project from the contractor with a hard task is resolved
on the basis of the sponsor's beliefs. If the sponsor views it likely that the
task will be easy then the sponsor will opt for the rent extraction
compensation function and be willing to forego the loss of surplus in the
event that the task proves to be hard. On the other hand, if the sponsor
deems it likely that the task will be hard then the risk of contractor drop-
out becomes too great, in which case the compensation function rises to
ensure contractor participation.
We now turn to the case where N > 1 . Since we restrict attention to
history independent compensation schemes the condition that governs the
choice of cost reducing effort is the same as in the one period game. The
substantive difference between this multipenod game and the single period
game lies in the participation decision for the contractor and the
compensation function decision for the sponsor. Both of these decisions are
influenced by the equilibrium play in periods closer to completion of the
project. That is, the expected rents to be earned influence these decisions.
13
In this section we assume that the contractor is risk neutral and,
hence, acts as an expected profit maximizer. Let the expected rent earned
Dy the contractor in the equilibrium of the one period game, R«, be defined
by
(10) R | = ( 1 - 0)Q j(w L )[p jCw1 ) - w L -TT] 0Q j(wH )[p f(w
H
) - w
H
- TTj.
Then, recursively define the expected rent earned by the contractor from
period l till completion of the game, R<, by
(11) R|-(1 -6)Q
j
(w L )[R
j
_
1
^p
j
(w L )-w L -TT] +
0Q
1
(wH )[R
j
_
1
p
i
(wH)-wH -n],
for i = 2,..., N. It follows that the contractor will continue to participate in
the project in period i only if
(12) R|_! P
f
(s
f
) - s
t
- tuO.io
In a similar fashion let the expected net benefit earned by the
sponsor in the equilibrium of the one period game, V,, be defined by
(13) V
]
= (1 - eX^w^tB - p^w1 )] 0Q
1
(wH )[B - Pj(wH )].
Then, recursively define the expected net benefit earned by the sponsor
from period i till completion of the game, v\, by
(14) v
1
= (1 - e)Q
t
(w L )[VM - p t (w L )] 0Q ] (wH )[v | _ 1 - p ](wH )],
10 ( 1 2) is written under the assumption that truthful signalling is optimal for the contractor.
We will continue to make this assumption in the remainder of the paper for ease in notation.
for i = 2,..., N. Evidently, the same reasoning as is given to prove
proposition 1 determines the optimal compensation scheme in period i. We
summarize this result in the following corollary
Corollary 1: Let (p*,Q*) denote the equilibrium compensation scheme and
contractor quit-stay function in period i for i = 2,...,N. Then
(i) p*(wL ) < - R|_ ! wL + rr, p*(wH ) < - R|_ | wL + a tt, and
Qfa O 1f VM i WL Tf;
(ii) p*(wL ) = - RM + wL + tt, p*(wH ) < - RM + wL + a + tt,
Q*(w L ) = l,andQ*(wH ) = if w L + tt i VM *wH + nor if VM * wH + rr and
H I
w -w -a
6 i : , and
V
i
_
1
-w
L
-a-TT*R
i
_
1
(iii) p*(wL ) = - R^_| + wH - a + tt, p*(wH ) - RM + wH rr,
H I
m ww a
andQ*= 1 If V
1 _ 1
1 w
n+
n and B i ; .
V
1
_
1
-w
L
-a-n+R
j
_
1
By substituting the results from corollary 1 into ( 11 ) it follows that
R
1
= if either case (i) or case (ii) holds and that R
1
= ( 1 - 6)[wH - wL - a] if
case (iii) holds. This limits the possible compensation schemes over time
to a manageable number. Since the sponsor can always induce contractor
drop-out by making the compensation function sufficiently low, it follows
that V
1
1 0. Then (14) implies that V. is nonincreasing in i and is decreasing
in i as long as V, > 0. It follows that if case (iii) holds in period i then it
necessarily holds in period i - I. In other words, the equilibrium contract
may entail an interval near completion where the sponsor is "locked in," i.e.,
the project is sufficiently close to completion that the sponsor funds the
project regardless of the costs. Prior to this lock-in phase the sponsor
funds the project only if the task proves to be easy and cancels if the task
proves to be hard. With the exception of the period just before lock-in,
there are no future rents to be earned by the contractor in this initial
phase and, consequently, the payment made to the contractor in this initial
phase equals project cost plus opportunity cost. Of course if the initial
phase is sufficiently long that the contractor believes the chance of drop-
out before lock-in is sufficiently great, then the sponsor cancels the
project initially rather than endure the risk of incurring substantial costs
without completing the project. We characterize the contractual
equilibrium in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 : There exists two nonnegative integers, I and a, a i a + 1 , such
that 9. * 1 and if £ 1 2 then
(i) p*(w L ) = wH - a + n, p*(wH ) = wH tt, and Q* s 1;
(ii)p*(wL ) = (1 -fl)w L + 0(wH -a)+ tt,
p*(wH ) = ( 1 - 0)[wL +a] + flwH n, and G* s 1 for i = 2.....J?.- 1
;
(iii) pJ(w
L
) = w L - ( 1 - 6)1 w
H
- wL - a] tt,
p£(wH ) < w L + a - ( 1 - $)[ wH - w L - a] + tt, Qj (w L ) 1 , Qj (wH ) = 0,
while for all values of £
(iv) p*(w L ) = w L n, p*(wH ) < w L a tt, Q*(w L ) = 1 . and
Q*(wH ) -Ofor i - £ + |,...,o - I; and
(v) p*(wL ) < w L + n, p*(wH ) < w L + a n, and Q* = for l 2 o
In figure 1 we graph the time path of the equilibrium compensation
scheme under the assumption that £ = and N < a. The payment scheme is
fiat in this case. That is, there will not be any cost overruns. In figure 2
we graph the time path of the compensation scheme under the assumption
that £ i 2 and N < a. In this case there is a tilting of the compensation
scheme. Payments are higher during lock-in than they are during the initial
phase of the project. We feel that since the initial phase is characterized
by cost plus compensation the lock-in phase can be reasonably interpreted
as the occurrence of cost overruns.
Contractor
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This completes the description of the basic model. In the next
section we present some extensions which embellish our basic results.
8Ml. Extensions
Contractor Risk Aversion
In the basic model payments during the lock-in phase are governed by
the idea that the contractor can earn rents with expected value equal to
( 1 - 0)[wH - wL - a] from continuing to participate in the project. This
expected rent is extracted from the contractor by reducing the current
period payment by an amount equal to the expected rent, though an
additional rent may be created if the self-selection constraint binds in the
current period. For a variety of reasons it may not be possible for the
sponsor to fully extract these rents from the contractor. For example,
H i
when rr < C 1 - 0)[wn - w - a] the contractor's out of pocket expense on the
project exceeds the payment received from the sponsor during any period in
the lock-in phase when the contractor has a hard task. If the contractor
does not have sizeable receipts from other activities in which the
contractor is simultaneously engaged and if the contractor has limited
collateral for accessing credit markets, liquidity constraints may make
such negative cash flow scenarios infeasible. In this section we present an
alternate reason for limited rent extraction based on contractor risk
aversion.
The intuition we have in mind is quite simple. The rent that the
contractor anticipates from participation in the project is risky. The
contractor would like to insure against this risk but the sponsor refuses to
provide insurance in the compensation scheme because such insurance
mitigates against the incentives for taking cost reducing effort. Thus,
while the sponsor can extract the expected rent from the contractor by
reducing the current period payment, the sponsor must pay the contractor a
risk premium. This risk premium has the effect of increasing the
contractor's compensation as compared to the risk neutral case.
Let u denote the contractor's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function defined over current period profit. Assume that u' > and u" < 0.
During the lock-in phase, which we focus on below, the participation
constraint for a contractor with a hard task in period i determines p^(wH )
and then the self-selection constraint yields p^w 1-) = p^wH ) - a. In period
1 the participation constraint when t, = H becomes
1
(15) u(p
]
(wH)-wH )^u(TT).
Since u is increasing this is identical to (7). Thus, there is no effect on the
period 1 payments, regardless of contractor risk aversion. For i 2 2 the
participation constraint In period 1 when L = H is
1-1
(16) u(p
j
(wH)-wH ) y[(1-0)u(^(w L )-w L )^u(p
h
(wH)-wH )j i i[u(rr)].
h=1
Since both the participation constraint when t|_| = H and the self-selection
constraint when tM =E bind in period 1-1, (16) reduces to
(17) utp^w^1 )- wH ) 2
u(rr)-(1 -0)[u(pM(wH ) -w L -a)-u(pM(w H)-wH )l
This inequality binds for all the periods in which lock-in occurs. Note that
the right hand side of ( 1 7) is increasing in P;_ ,(w ) since u is strictly
H H H H
concave. Moreover, n = p^w ) - w > P2<w ) - w Thus, it follows from a
straightforward induction argument that Pj(w ) is decreasing in i, i.e.,
compensation rises during lock-in as the project nears completion. That is,
the compensation is both higher and more sharply sloped when the
contractor is risk averse than when the contractor is risk neutral. 11
Noisy Signalling
In the basic model we assumed that the sponsor observed a perfectly
informative signal of the contractor's cost reducing effort. It may be
more reasonable to assume that there are factors which influence these
signalled costs outside the control of the contractor, in which case the
signalled cost should be taken as a random variable. But then upon
observing a high signalled cost the sponsor will be unsure whether this is
the result of a lack of effort on the part of the contractor or whether this
is simply the consequence of bad luck. This makes the model more like the
standard principal-agent model. 12 It is well known that in the standard
principal-agent model it is optimal to make the agent a residual claimant
when the agent is risk neutral. When the agent bears all the risk the agent
faces the right incentives for taking effort. However, in our model making
the contractor the residual claimant is not optimal during the lock-in
phase, because excessive rents will be earned by the contractor when the
task is easy. But, we show that there is an optimal linear compensation
1
1
The effect that contractor risk aversion has on the shape of the compensation function lowers
the net expected benefit accruing to the sponsor and may consequently shorten the length of the
lock -in phase.
12 For a good exposition of the principal -agent model see Holmstrom ( 1 979).
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schedule for which the results under perfectly informative signalling can
be duplicated under noisy signalling, in an expected value sense.
Let c< be the random variable denoting signalled costs in period i.
Cj is taken to have support over the Interval [£,c] and have distribution
function F(eJ, where F(1) dominates F(O) In the sense of first order
c
stochastic dominance. Moreover, assume Jcf(c,0)dc = w and
c
Jcf(c, l)dc= w . In other words, w is the expected signalled cost when no
c
cost reducing effort is taken and w L is the expected signalled cost when
cost reducing effort is taken. The remainder of the setup of the basic
model is unchanged.
Suppose the compensation function is a linear function of the
observed signalled cost, i.e., P|(cp = p^ + Pj fa. Then it is straightforward
to show that a contractor who has an easy task in period i and who has
agreed to complete task i will take cost reducing effort only if
(18) pn i
w
H
-w
L
Slmilarly, it is straightforward to show that a contractor who has a hard
task in period i and who has agreed to complete task i will not take cost
reducing effort only if
(19) pn i
w
H
-w
L
-c
e(H.w L )
w
H
-w
L
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We will taKe Pj i to De delimited by the closed interval determined by
(18) and (19). For a given value of p^ in this interval, p 10 takes on the
lowest possible value consistent with satisfaction of the participation (
constraint for the contractor with a hard task in period i. This yields
(20) p i0
= w
H
(l -pn )
+
rr - R
i
_
v
Any pair, (Pja,Pm), which satisfies (20) yields the same expected payments
to a contractor with a hard task in period i. However, for such pairs the
payment to a contractor with a low cost in period l as a function of p* j is
(2 1
)
E[p
1
lt
1
= E] w
H
* p
1
^w1 - w
H
) rr - R
1
_
1
.
The sponsor would like to minimize the right hand side of (21 ). Hence in the
optimal linear compensation scheme, ( 1 8) will bind.
The reader can readily verify that when
< x r
wH-wL-a i h r a i
P|(c
'
)
=
t"7V-JwtTT
+ [^AJ c ' andwhen
H I[ww a t w ran
~^Q7 ]w + n - ( ' " e) 'wH " WL -a' + [^T^j c ) for
i = 2,...,JM, the expected payment to the contractor is identical to the
payment when signalled cost provides perfect information as to contractor
cost reducing effort.
There are two important points to note about the optimal linear
compensation scheme. First, the slope of the compensation function is less
than one. In particular cost plus pricing is not optimal because, as in
standard principal-agent models, if the contractor bears none of the risk
then the contractor has no incentive to take cost reducing effort. Second,
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the Intercept of the compensation function rises over time. Schemes which
are rigid in their temporal component are not optimal. 13
Contractor Impatience and Project Delays
In the basic model the only way for the sponsor to induce truthful
signalling on the part of the contractor during the lock-in phase is by
offering payments in the current period which satisfy the self-selection
constraint. However, once it is assumed that the contractor exhibits
impatience, there is a second method available to the sponsor. The sponsor
could encourage the contractor with a hard task to delay completion of the
task for one period by paying the contractor's opportunity cost in the
current period if the contractor chooses to delay coupled with making a
relatively low payment to the contractor if the task is immediately
completed. The sponsor could nevertheless encourage the contractor with
an easy task to complete the task in the current period. The benefit to the
contractor from immediately completing the task is that the expected
future rents would be earned one period earlier. In other words, when the
contractor discounts the future project delays can emerge in equilibrium
as a self-selection device. 14 It is our purpose here to illustrate when this
form of self-selection is apt to emerge.
13 The results that Lewis ( 1 986) obtains may very well depend on the fact that Lewis takes the
compensation function as parametric and time invariant. Our results strongly suggest that the
compensation function in Lewis' model is not optimal. It is not obvious whether Lewis' results are
robust to an endogenous determination of the compensation function along the lines of this paper.
14 This idea was motivated by Grossman and Perry ( 1 986) who obtain similar results in a
bargaining context.
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Let 8 denote the contractor's discount factor. We continue to assume
that the sponsor does not discount the future. 15 Let R, now denote the
expected future rent accruing to the contractor when there are i tasks (
remaining discounted to the current period. Suppose at the start of task i
the sponsor offers the contractor the payment p^ n for completing task i
immediately or offers the payment tt for delaying construction for 1 period.
Assume for the moment that this scheme does induce self-selection on the
part of the contractor so that the contractor with an easy task is paid p^ n
for completing task i while the contractor with a hard task takes tt and
delays construction. Then after the construction delay the sponsor's
equilibrium beliefs about task i are that it is hard with probability 1. Since
we are assuming that task i occurs during the lock-in stage the sponsor
will then offer the contractor the payment p
1cl
, p
1c]
= - R
t
_j + w
H
+ tt, in
order to satisfy the voluntary participation constraint for the contractor
with a hard task. Of course the contractor with an easy task could also
delay completion of task i, take rr in the current period and rationally
anticipate earning p 1d when task 1 Is completed in the subsequent period. In
order for the contractor with an easy task to find it optimal to complete
task i without delay it must be that
(22) p 1n
- w L - tt + RM i 6[p jd - w L - a - tt + RM ] = 6[wH - wL - a].
15 The real Issue \nere Is the relative impatience of the two parties. We assume that the sponsor
does not discount the future, just as we assumed that the sponsor is risk neutral in out discussion
of contractor risk aversion, for simplicity.
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If the sponsor does find It optimal to utilize project delays then (22) will
bind In equilibrium. In this case the no delay payment made after completion
of task 1 Is
(23) p jn
= w L * TT - R
t
_
}
5[wH - w L - a].
Observe that when 5 = 1 the value of Pj given in (23) coincides with the
value of Pj(wL ) during the lock-in phase for I > 1. Hence the effect of
project delays in conjunction with contractor discounting is to lower the
payment to the contractor with an easy task.
The value to the sponsor from pursuing this delaying strategy
in period i, V^, is given by
(24) v
Jd
-(i-e)[vM -p jn ] + e[vM -p Jd -n].
The value to the sponsor from having the project completed without delay,
regardless of cost, V: is given by
(25) v jn
= (l " 0)[v
i-l
+ R
i-l
" wH + a - n] + 0[VM RM - w H - it].
After making the substitutions for P| and p jh it can be seen that V jcj i V
if and only if
H I
w -w a
(26) e i
wH-wL -a+n/(1-5)
By comparing (26) to the inequality given in case (iii) of corollary 1 it can
be seen that this use of project delays to induce self-selection is only
relevant when V
j
_
]
- wL - a - n + R< , > w
H
- w L -a + rr/( 1-5). Thus
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project delays are more likely to occur the closer the project is to
completion, where V^_
^
is large. Earlier in the lock-in phase the sponsor
will prefer to induce self-selection via the method developed in the basic %
model.
In our view the assumption that the contractor exhibits impatience is
more relevant when the contractor is highly leveraged and may be rationed
in borrowing additional funds at market rates. This would seem to be likely
when the scale of the project is large relative to the size of the
contractor's entire operation. Thus our result can be interpreted as
predicting a correlation between project size and the incidence of project
delays, giving some credence to the popular view that it is massive public
projects for which the 'horror stories' mentioned in the introduction are
most likely.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a dynamic model of a contract game
whose sequential equilibrium has the property that in some circumstances
the compensation per task rises as the project nears completion, although
the expected cost per task is time invariant. We have interpreted these
results as predicting cost overruns as equilibrium outcomes when these
circumstances prevail. Based on analysis of our model cost overruns are
more likely the larger the benefit accruing to the sponsor and the longer
the time from initiation to completion of the project. In other words,
project scale matters in predicting cost overruns.
Since actual compensation functions are almost always written on a
cost plus basis our model can be interpreted as predicting cost overruns as
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equilibrium outcomes only when contractors can falsify upwards their
reported costs with little affect on their actual costs. Our model implies
that the sponsor goes along with such falsification, even though the sponsor
is well aware of the truth, because such falsification is the only way to
attain the equilibrium level of compensation. If such falsification is highly
costly to the contractor then our model suggests that actual, cost plus
compensation functions are not optimal and may then suggest that
contractors do not take the appropriate cost reducing effort in actuality.
We prefer the first interpretation though we recognize that the second
interpretation also has its merits.
Are cost overruns something economists should worry about? Most
of the public concern appears to be over the rent extraction issue. It
should be noted that our basic model implies that this is not a problem.
Except In the case where the sponsor is locked in right from the initiation
of the project the equilibrium of our model has the property that the
contractor does not earn any rents overall. Moreover, there is nothing to
preclude the sponsor from setting up a competitive bidding among candidate
contractors for the rights to the project prior to the commencement of
construction as a means of extracting the rents, when the sponsor is locked
in right at the beginning of construction. We are agnostic as to whether
complete rent extraction occurs in actuality. We merely point out here
that if our model is to be taken seriously then some form of nonlinearity in
the contractor's payoff function must be demonstrated to make incomplete
rent extraction a concern. In the absence of such nonlinearities the public
uproar over cost overruns may be best attributed to time inconsistent
attitudes concerning the value of project completion.
Nevertheless, our basic model does point to a form of inefficiency
which, as far as we are aware, has not received any popular attention.
Since the equilibrium of our model has the property that it induces self- {
selection on the part of the contractor with regard to the costs the
contractor announces to the sponsor, the only way that inefficiency can be
manifest in our basic model is by completion of the project in instances
where it would be socially optimal to cancel the project or by cancellation
of the project when it would by socially optimal for the project to be
brought to completion. It should be noted that in our model the sponsor is
assumed incapable of precommiting to the length of the lock-in phase.
Hence there is no reason to expect that the equilibrium length of the lock-in
phase is optimal. It turns out that when the expected quasirents earned by
the contractor during the lock-in phase are large relative to the net
expected benefits of the sponsor during this phase then the lock-in phase
will be too short from a social welfare view. In such instances it would be
beneficial for the sponsor to announce sometime prior to lock-in that it
intends to see the project to completion. These instances are more likely
to occur the greater the probability that any particular task is easy and the
greater the cost wedge between hard and easy tasks since both of these
factors contribute to the size of the quasirents. In other words, there are
real social costs because the sponsor is incapable of making a credible
commitment at project initiation to the compensation schedule it will
honor over the lifetime of the project.
This observation provides the basis for an argument that government
agencies should be guided by procurement rules concerning the cancellation
decision rigid enough to ensure efficient project completion. Ironically
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rules appear to guide the choice of compensation schedule where some
sponsor discretion, i.e., a departure from cost plus pricing, may be
desirable. Yet the cancellation decision appears to be left to the discretion
of the project administrator. From our perspective a redefining of the
project administrator's authority would be highly desirable.
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